Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
1 These undisputed facts are drawn from State court filings presented below. See generally
Matter of A-S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 493, 498 (BIA 2008).
795
Matter of Roberto CARDENAS ABREU, Respondent
File A046 046 300 – Marcy, New York
Decided May 4, 2009
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
A pending late-reinstated appeal of a criminal conviction, filed pursuant to section 460.30
of the New York Criminal Procedure Law, does not undermine the finality of the conviction
for purposes of the immigration laws.
FOR RESPONDENT: Pro se
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Laura A. Michalec, Assistant
Chief Counsel
BEFORE: Board En Banc: OSUNA, Chairman; HOLMES, FILPPU, MALPHRUS, and
MULLANE, Board Members. Concurring Opinions: GRANT, Board Member; PAULEY,
Board Member, joined by COLE, Board Member. Dissenting Opinion: GREER, Board
Member, joined by NEAL, Vice Chairman; MILLER, HESS, ADKINS-BLANCH, and
WENDTLAND, Board Members.
MALPHRUS, Board Member:
In a decision dated October 30, 2008, an Immigration Judge denied the
respondent’s motion to reopen his proceedings, in which he argued that his
criminal conviction was not final because he had been granted permission to
file a late appeal. The respondent has appealed from that decision. The appeal
will be dismissed.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The respondent is a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic who was
admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident on June 26, 1996.
On October 11, 2007, the respondent was convicted of first degree burglary in
violation of section 140.30 of the New York Penal Law.1
The record reflects
that he failed to file an appeal within the 30-day deadline provided inCite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
2
The granting of this motion to reopen would require that these removal proceedings be
terminated. Also, the respondent would not be subject to the custody of the Department of
Homeland Security on this basis.
796
section 460.10(1)(a) of the New York Criminal Procedure Law. The
respondent was placed in removal proceedings and was charged under section
237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006), as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.
The Immigration Judge ordered him removed in a decision dated July 22,
2008. The respondent did not appeal that decision.
In a motion dated August 15, 2008, the respondent requested that the State
criminal court grant him permission to file a late appeal pursuant to section
460.30 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law. Over opposition from the
State, the court granted the respondent’s motion on September 26, 2008,
reinstating the time for filing an appeal. The respondent filed a motion to
reopen his removal proceedings on October 14, 2008, claiming that his
criminal conviction was not final because he had been granted permission to
file a late appeal.2
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) opposed
the motion to reopen, arguing that the respondent’s conviction remained final
and valid for immigration purposes. The Immigration Judge concluded that
the respondent’s conviction remained a valid predicate for the charge of
removability and denied the respondent’s motion to reopen.
II. ANALYSIS
In 1996, Congress enacted section 322(a)(1) of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-628 (“IIRIRA”), which set forth a
definition of the term “conviction.” This definition is in section 101(a)(48)(A)
of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2006), which provides as follows:
The term “conviction” means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt
of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where—
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of
guilt, and
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the
alien’s liberty to be imposed.
Initially, we must “determine whether the language at issue has a plain and
unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.”
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). Issues regarding whether
the language is plain and unambiguous are “determined by reference to theCite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
3 In Puello v. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, 511 F.3d 324, 332
(2d Cir. 2007), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, within
whose jurisdiction this case arises, reasoned in dicta that the statutory definition of
the term “conviction” in section 101(a)(48)(A) eliminated the finality requirement.
However, that case related to the effective date of a conviction and did not
involve a challenge based on the appeal of a conviction. Other circuit courts that
have addressed the principle of finality since the enactment of the IIRIRA have
applied disparate analyses to reach different conclusions, and none has considered the
issue in the context of a late-reinstated appeal. See Paredes v. Att’y Gen. of U.S.,
528 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2008); Garcia-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 284 (5th Cir.
2007); United States v. Saenz-Gomez, 472 F.3d 791 (10th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Garcia-Echaverria, 374 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. 2004); Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d
1035 (7th Cir. 2004); Griffiths v. INS, 243 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2001).
797
language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the
broader context of the statute as a whole.” Id. at 341.
The DHS argues that under the plain language of section 101(a)(48)(A) of
the Act, the respondent has a conviction because the State criminal court
entered “a formal judgment of guilt” on October 11, 2007. The DHS therefore
contends that even if the respondent had filed a direct appeal within 30 days
of his conviction, the conviction would still be valid for immigration purposes.
On the other hand, the respondent essentially argues that the language of
section 101(a)(48)(A) is ambiguous as to the “particular dispute in the case,”
id. at 340, specifically, the question of finality, and he claims that under case
law that preceded the enactment of the IIRIRA, his conviction is not final for
purposes of the immigration laws. It is not necessary to adopt either argument
to determine the issue presented in this case.3
A.
When Congress enacted the IIRIRA and defined the term “conviction” for
the first time, it expressed a clear intent to address convictions in the
deferred adjudication context. Congress was concerned that convictions in this
context should not be “dependent on the vagaries of State law” and intended
to prevent the various ameliorative State court proceedings from undermining
the immigration consequences of a violation of State criminal laws. Matter
of Punu, 22 I&N Dec. 224, 229 (BIA 1998). Congress achieved this result by
adopting almost verbatim key portions of our earlier decision in
Matter of Ozkok, supra, at 551-52, which set forth a standard for determining
the existence of a conviction for immigration purposes. But it also expanded
the Ozkok definition of a conviction by eliminating that part of the standard
under which a deferred adjudication was a conviction only if a judgment of
guilt could be entered “without availability of further proceedings” in whichCite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
4 At the time, there were other provisions of the Act that expressly included a requirement
that a judgment be final, but Congress did not amend any of them. Compare former section
241(a)(2)(D) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(D) (1994) (regarding the deportability of
“[a]ny alien who at any time has been convicted (the judgment on such conviction becoming
final)”), with section 237(a)(2)(D) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(D) (2006) (same).
798
to contest the alien’s guilt. Thus, Congress provided that an alien who has a
deferred adjudication with a finding of guilt and a punishment, penalty, or
restraint on liberty has been convicted of the offense, regardless of the
potential for further ameliorative criminal proceedings to affect that
determination of guilt. See Matter of Punu, supra, at 227; see also H.R. Rep.
No. 104-828, at 224 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), 1996 WL 563320 (stating that the
“new provision, by removing the third prong of Ozkok, clarifies Congressional
intent that even in cases where adjudication is ‘deferred,’ the original finding
or confession of guilt is sufficient to establish a ‘conviction’ for purposes of
the immigration laws”).
At the time the IIRIRA was enacted, it was well established in immigration
law that a criminal conviction attains finality for immigration purposes
when procedures for direct appeal have been exhausted or waived. See
Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546, 552 n.7 (BIA 1988); see also, e.g.,
Morales-Alvarado v. INS, 655 F.2d 172, 175 (9th Cir. 1981);
Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 570 (6th Cir. 1975). This
well-accepted principle can be traced to the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955). The legislative
history of the IIRIRA accompanying the adoption of the definition of a
“conviction” gave no indication of an intent to disturb this principle that an
alien must waive or exhaust his direct appeal rights to have a final conviction.
See Matter of Punu, supra, at 227 (discussing the legislative history of the
term “conviction” in section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act).4
With this backdrop
regarding the broad context of this issue and the statute, a forceful
argument can be made that Congress intended to preserve the long-standing
requirement of finality for direct appeals as of right in immigration law.
See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 530-31
(1998) (holding that Congress implicitly adopted the Supreme Court’s
well-established definition of terms regarding a central issue in Indian law of
what constitutes “Indian country” when it adopted language “taken virtually
verbatim from” prior caselaw).
We need not resolve that issue, however, because the case before us
involves a late-reinstated appeal, not a direct appeal. At the time Congress
acted in 1996, there was no understanding of the effect on finality of
late-reinstated appeals similar to the well-established rule for direct appeals.
The Board expressly reserved this question less than 2 years before theCite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
5 In stating that the respondent’s conviction should not be viewed as final, the dissent relies
in part on Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S. Ct. 681, 686 (2009), where the Supreme Court
determined that a Federal habeas corpus petitioner whose appeal was reinstated out of time
through a State collateral attack, before he had first sought habeas relief, did not receive a
final judgment until the conclusion of the direct appeal. However, in general, habeas corpus
law is not analogous to immigration law. See Matter of Aguilar-Aquino, 24 I&N Dec. 747,
752-53 (BIA 2009) (finding that the definition of “custody” in habeas corpus proceedings
does not govern immigration proceedings). First, the purpose of Federal habeas corpus
proceedings is to provide convicted defendants an avenue to collaterally attack the validity
of their convictions. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234 (1990). However, aliens
may not contest the facts or merits of their convictions in immigration proceedings. Matter
of C-, 20 I&N Dec. 529, 532 (BIA 1992); Matter of McNaughton, 16 I&N Dec. 569, 571
(BIA 1978). In addition, under Federal habeas corpus law, a conviction is final only after
direct discretionary review is complete. Jimenez v. Quarterman, supra, at 684-86. By
contrast, the potential for discretionary review on direct appeal does not disturb the finality
of a conviction for immigration purposes. See Matter of Polanco, supra, at 896. Moreover,
the Supreme Court in Jimenez applied “the most natural reading of the statutory text” of the
Federal habeas statute. Jimenez v. Quarterman, supra, at 685. In this case, the language of
section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act clearly supports our conclusion regarding the finality of
late-reinstated appeals for immigration purposes.
799
enactment of the IIRIRA in Matter of Polanco, 20 I&N Dec. 894 (BIA 1994),
declining to decide whether late-reinstated appeals (also known as appeals
taken nunc pro tunc, or “now for then”) should be accorded the same treatment
with regard to finality as direct appeals as of right. Thus, regardless of the
strength of the argument that Congress intended to preserve the traditional
treatment of direct appeals, that argument fails in the context of late-reinstated
appeals because Congress could not have intended to preserve something that
did not exist.5
B.
Congress’s treatment of deferred adjudication proceedings in the IIRIRA
informs our approach to late-reinstated appeals because both procedures
present an added measure of delay and uncertainty regarding the consequences
of criminal convictions in immigration proceedings. In order to resolve the
issue left open in Matter of Polanco, supra, we look first to the statute.
Section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act provides that a conviction exists when a
“formal judgment of guilt” is “entered by a court,” a requirement that is
satisfied here. Following the Ozkok rule in the context of deferred
adjudication, Congress also determined that a conviction occurs upon an
admission or finding of guilt and the imposition of “some form of punishment,
penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty.” Id. However, Congress eliminatedCite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
800
the additional part of the Ozkok rule that exempted criminal aliens with a
deferred adjudication from the immigration consequences of a conviction if
they retained a right to pursue further proceedings to contest their guilt at an
unknown time in the future. In so doing, Congress reflected its concern about
the problems presented by the indeterminate nature of such proceedings and
clearly expressed its disfavor with aliens’ pursuit of avenues available under
State laws to allow them to delay indefinitely the conclusion of immigration
proceedings.
Even before Congress created a definition for the term “conviction” in the
IIRIRA, there existed a “long-standing rule” that whether a conviction exists
for immigration purposes “is a question of federal law and should not
depend on the vagaries of state law.” Matter of Ozkok, supra, at 549, 551 n.6
(citing Matter of A-F-, 8 I&N Dec. 429, 446 (BIA, A.G. 1959)). Some of the
problems arising from the various ameliorative procedures available under
State law were implicit in Matter of Polanco, supra, which involved a New
Jersey late-reinstated appeal procedure similar to that at issue in this case. The
New Jersey court rules required that a request to file a nunc pro tunc appeal be
made in a timely manner, although without a specific outside time limit.
Furthermore, the criminal court’s determination whether to grant a request
to file a late-reinstated appeal was “discretionary in nature” and therefore
went beyond simply deciding if it was deemed to have been filed in a
timely manner. Id. at 897. Thus, the procedure involved an unpredictable
and indeterminate delay in immigration proceedings with no reasonable
expectation that the alien would ultimately be granted relief from the
conviction.
The concerns present in Matter of Polanco regarding the finality of a
conviction subject to a late appeal process also exist in the New York
procedure in this case. Section 460.10(1)(a) of New York Criminal Procedure
Law provides for a direct appeal as of right within 30 days of a criminal
conviction. However, if a defendant fails to meet this deadline, a motion may
be filed within 1 year from the unmet deadline to present evidence showing
that certain enumerated factors resulted in the defendant’s failure to appeal.
Id. §§ 460.30(1)-(2); see also People v. Corso, 40 N.Y.2d 578 (1976). Thus,
a defendant may file a motion requesting permission to file a late-reinstated
appeal more than a year after he is convicted, provided that he also
demonstrates “due diligence” in filing the motion. Id. § 460.30(1). If the State
opposes the motion, the appellate court must determine if a hearing is required
and, if so, remand the matter to the trial court to conduct the hearing. Id.
§§ 460.30(2)-(5). Furthermore, the decision on the motion itself may be
appealed under certain circumstances. Id. § 460.30(6). Thus, while New York
law does have an eventual deadline for making a request to file a late appeal,
the statute permits motions to file an appeal to be made over a year after theCite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
6 We note that the respondent’s motion to file a late appeal was contested by the State
because of the length of the delay in filing the motion and the lack of adequate proof to
support it.
7 These interests are especially prevalent in a case such as this, where the respondent waited
until after he was ordered removed before even attempting to challenge the basis for his
removal order and has provided no explanation for this delay. Cf. Matter of Cerna, 20 I&N
Dec. 399, 403 (BIA 1991) (noting that “we are not favorably disposed to the practice of
waiting until the conclusion of the administrative appeal process to file a motion that seeks
to offer additional evidence regarding the matter previously in issue”).
801
criminal conviction, and the resolution of such motions has no time limit.
Ultimately, if the appellate court grants the motion, a defendant may be
provided an additional 30 days to actually file the late-reinstated appeal. Id.
§ 460.30(1).
This New York procedure introduces a layer of uncertainty and delay far
beyond that of a traditional appeal. This is, in part, a result of the long
deadline for filing a motion and the unlimited nature of its resolution, but also
because the procedure provides for a potentially extensive fact-based and
judgment-laden inquiry. For example, the State court must determine the
reason for the delay in filing a motion and whether the defendant acted with
“due diligence” in filing it.6
Id. § 460.30(1). The court could also be required
to resolve whether a public servant or a defendant’s attorney engaged in
“improper conduct.” Id. Thus, the late-reinstated appeal procedure under New
York law is very different from the typical direct appeal as of right, which
imposes prompt filing deadlines and requires only a ministerial act in
accepting a notice of appeal.
Concerns regarding uncertainty in removal proceedings are amplified in the
context of a motion to reopen, which is a disfavored process that imposes a
heavy burden on the moving party to show that reopening is warranted. See
INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 107,
111 (1988). Finality and predictability are important principles in the law,
including in immigration law. See INS v. Abudu, supra, at 107 (“There is a
strong public interest in bringing litigation to a close as promptly as is
consistent with the interest in giving the adversaries a fair opportunity to
develop and present their respective cases.”).7
In this case, removal proceedings were initiated, the Immigration Judge held
a hearing, and the respondent was ordered removed, all before he even filed
his motion for a late-reinstated appeal in State court. He then sought to reopen
his removal proceedings based on a claim that his conviction is no longer final.
The respondent was permitted to reinstate the time to appeal his conviction
under a special State procedure that creates significant uncertainty and delay
in reaching an ultimate resolution regarding the existence of an otherwise finalCite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
8 A pending collateral attack also does not disturb the finality of a conviction and therefore
would not justify reopening of removal proceedings. See Matter of Adetiba, 20 I&N
Dec. 506, 508 (BIA 1992). If the respondent’s conviction is ultimately vacated, however,
he would be able to seek reopening to the same extent as an alien with a vacated conviction
resulting from a successful collateral attack. See Matter of Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 I&N
Dec. 1378, 1380 (BIA 2000); cf. Saleh v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 17, 24-25 (2d Cir. 2007).
802
conviction. Congress intended to prevent the immigration laws from being
“dependent on the vagaries of State law” when it defined the term “conviction”
in section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act. Under these circumstances, we find that
the respondent’s pending late-reinstated appeal does not undermine the finality
of his conviction for purposes of the immigration laws and conclude that it is
therefore not appropriate to reopen and terminate these proceedings.8
III. CONCLUSION
Given the indeterminate nature of the New York late appeal procedure
and Congress’s clear intent to give broad effect to the definition of a
conviction in the deferred adjudication context, we find that the respondent’s
conviction remains a valid factual predicate for the charge of removability.
We therefore conclude the Immigration Judge properly denied the motion to
reopen. Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal will be dismissed.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.
CONCURRING OPINION: Edward R. Grant, Board Member
I respectfully concur.
I join in the well-reasoned decision of the majority. While it may not be
absolutely necessary in this case to address the underlying question whether
the “finality” requirement is still applicable and binding in removal
proceedings, I would nevertheless do so. For the reasons cogently stated in the
dissent, I would find that the “finality” requirement does still apply to cases
where a direct appeal is pending or direct appeal rights have not been
exhausted.
Fortunately, it appears that both the Department of Homeland Security and
Immigration Judges continue to follow this rule. Even in those circuits where
the court of appeals has indicated that the finality rule is no longer binding, it
is a sound exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and in keeping with the goal of
uniform administration of the immigration laws, to refrain from initiatingCite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
803
removal proceedings based on a criminal conviction until any right of direct
appeal from that conviction has been exhausted or waived.
For the reasons stated in the majority, this is just such a case. Removal
proceedings were held in abeyance until well after the statutory period for
direct appeal had expired. Those proceedings continued and resulted in
the entry of an order of removal. It was only then that the respondent chose
to take advantage of the unique “late-filed” appeal procedure available under
New York law. Just as the initiation of removal proceedings prior to
exhaustion or expiration of direct appeal rights would undermine the uniform
enforcement of immigration laws, allowing an alien to forestall such
proceedings, once properly begun, by filing a “late” appeal would impede the
administration of justice.
Exceptions to this ruling may apply if the alien were to present compelling
evidence of the likelihood of success on his late-filed criminal appeal. In such
circumstances, sound judgment would dictate that proceedings before the
Immigration Judge or this Board be held in abeyance until resolution of the
appeal. But no such showing has been made in this case.
CONCURRING OPINION: Roger A. Pauley, Board Member, in which
Patricia A. Cole, Board Member, joined
Although I join the majority opinion insofar as it addresses the finality
issue in the narrow context of statutes that permit the late reinstatement of a
direct appeal of a conviction, I write separately to respond to the dissenting
opinion insofar as it contends that finality still generally exists as a
requirement for a “conviction” for immigration purposes, notwithstanding the
plain language of section 101(a)(48) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2006), an assertion not gainsaid (and indeed
arguably supported in dicta) by the majority opinion. As explained herein, the
dissenting opinion is incorrect for many reasons.
I.
To begin with, the rationale of the dissent is incompatible with
Supreme Court authority. Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184 (1991). To
comprehend why, imagine that no agency such as the Board ever existed and
that Congress were now creating the definition of a “conviction” in section
101(a)(48)(A) of the Act for the first time. It is undisputed that the definition
nowhere expressly embodies the requirement that, in immigration proceedings,
a conviction must have been affirmed on direct appeal or that the time for
taking a direct appeal must have expired in order for it to be deemed a
“conviction.” Ordinarily, and in the hypothetical circumstances describedCite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
1 The dissent does not contend that the definition is incomplete, apart from its alleged failure
to incorporate the concept of finality. The only apparent basis to do so is that the definition
fails to state that a reversed conviction is not covered. Compare Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N
Dec. 621 (BIA 2003), where the Board noted that one court of appeals found the text of
section 101(a)(48)(A) so clear as to compel a finding that even a conviction reversed on the
merits remained a “conviction” for immigration purposes. However, the Board declined to
adopt this interpretation, deeming it to be contrary to our precedent. Id. at 624 n.2; see also
Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 61 n.5 (1980) (rejecting as “extreme” the argument that
a reversed conviction remained a conviction for purposes of the statute punishing possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon, but noting that the statute would apply where, as here,
possession occurred while a conviction was pending on appeal). A well-recognized (indeed
the sole) exception to the axiom that plain language in a statute must be followed is that
doing so would lead to absurd or bizarre results. E.g., Demarest v. Manspeaker, supra.
Thus, Congress is not obliged to negate absurd or bizarre consequences that flow from a
literal application of the language it enacts, and accordingly its definition of a “conviction”
in section 101(a)(48)(A) is not incomplete for its omission to provide that reversed
convictions are not within its scope.
804
above, were Congress to enact such plain language which lacks a “finality”
requirement, I do not understand the dissenting opinion to deny that the text
would command obedience. I believe it does so here as well. The dissent,
however, purports to find contextual ambiguity in the otherwise clear and
complete definition provided by Congress,1
permitting those joining that
opinion to deem the finality concept implicitly preserved, arising from the
Board’s long-standing previous understanding that a “conviction” for
immigration purposes must have attained finality in the sense of having been
affirmed on direct appeal, or the waiver of, or elapsing of the time to take,
such an appeal having occurred. See Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546, 552
n.7 (BIA 1988).
Unsurprisingly, no case law supports this novel proposition. To the
contrary, as noted above, it is squarely at odds with Demarest v. Manspeaker,
supra. Therein, the Court noted that the court of appeals below had “relied on
long-standing administrative construction of the statute denying attendance
fees to prisoners, and two Court of Appeals decisions to the same effect,
followed by congressional revision of the statute in 1978.” Id. at 190 (footnote
omitted). The Court, however, unanimously rejected the administrative and
judicial construction placed upon the statute, finding that the language of the
statute was clear and did not lead to absurd or bizarre results, and that
“administrative interpretation of a statute contrary to language as plain as we
find here is not entitled to deference.” Id. The situation in Demarest
v. Manspeaker is directly analogous, save only that there the agency’s past
interpretation of a term was supported by holdings of two appellate courts,Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
2 Although Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation
of a statute and to adopt that preexisting interpretation when it reenacts a statute without
change, Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978), that case and others like it are
inapposite because we are not dealing with a reenactment of a statute by Congress. Rather,
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, embodied an unequivocal break with the prior
judicial and administrative requirement of finality of convictions in immigration proceedings
in that it included, for the first time, a statutory definition of the term “conviction” under the
Act.
805
which is not the case here. Thus, Demarest v. Manspeaker alone is a
refutation of the dissent’s analysis.2
Both the dissenting and the majority opinions invoke Alaska v. Native
Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520 (1998). But that case is not
analogous. Even assuming no distinction for statutory construction purposes
between prior Supreme Court decisions and administrative agency
interpretations, in terms of the respect deemed to be accorded them by
Congress, the Court in Alaska v. Native Village pegged its decision to the fact
that the legislative history of the statute at issue reflected that it was intended
by Congress to codify the Supreme Court’s own prior decisions. Id. at 530.
In contrast, all the dissent can muster by way of legislative history is
congressional silence. This is insufficient.
Moreover, Alaska v. Native Village construed a statute where Congress
adopted the entirety of the definition contained in the Supreme Court’s prior
decisions defining Indian country. Here, by contrast, Congress did not adopt
in whole the Board’s prior understanding of the term “conviction.” To the
contrary, it adopted only a portion thereof and indeed embodied as an express
(and executed in language) purpose to eliminate any requirement, previously
embodied in the Board’s prior practice and understanding, pertaining to
finality in the deferred adjudication context. To infer from this a purpose of
Congress to retain the principle of finality elsewhere in the definition, wholly
unsupported by any legislative language or history, is simply to make an
illogical leap. Thus, absent any wholesale adoption in the text of the definition
enacted as section 101(a)(48) of the Board’s previous understanding regarding
the necessity that a conviction have attained “finality,” or even any legislative
history reflecting an intent to preserve the principle of finality for types of
convictions other than deferred adjudications, reliance on Alaska v. Native
Village is unavailing.
In addition and significantly, Congress elected to define a “conviction”
very precisely, using the limiting term “means” instead of allowing for a
broader administrative or judicial interpretation by using the enlarging
term “includes” to communicate nonexclusivity. As the Supreme Court
has recognized, a “‘definition which declares what a term “means” . . .Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
3 Thus, in its conclusion, the dissenting opinion asserts that “[a]bsent clear statutory
language to the contrary,” it would find that the “rule of finality in immigration law
continues to apply.” Matter of Cardenas Abreu, 24 I&N Dec. 795, 823 (BIA 2009).
806
excludes any meaning that is not stated.’” Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379,
392 n.10 (1979) (quoting 2A C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction
§ 47.07 (4th ed. Supp. 1978)); see also Burgess v. United States, 128 S. Ct.
1572, 1578 n.3 (2008).
Furthermore, the dissenting opinion’s unwarranted creation of a new
exception to the plain language rule would tend to undermine the separation
of powers and confer upon the Board (and by extension all administrative
agencies charged with the interpretation of the statute or statutes they
administer) a power to influence the content of legislation derived from its
prior practice and understanding of a term, notwithstanding that Congress has
undertaken for the first time to define it and has nowhere incorporated that
understanding or practice in its definition. For Congress to be found to have
rejected the Board’s understanding that finality is a component of a conviction,
the dissent concludes, it is insufficient for Congress merely to fail to include
any reference to finality in its language. Silence in an otherwise complete
definition is not enough. The dissent’s remarkable position is that Congress,
partially constrained by the Board’s prior understanding of a “conviction,”
must have acted affirmatively in statutory language to repudiate it, before they
will acknowledge that it has been superseded.3
The dissent’s measured prose
cannot disguise the radical nature of its thesis, one that siphons lawmaking
authority from Congress and vests it in administrative agencies such as the
Board.
In sum and in essence, the dissenting opinion falls into fundamental error
in exalting the legislative history, consisting merely of an absence of
expression of intent to discard or alter the Board’s previous understanding that
a conviction requires finality, over the plain statutory language employed by
Congress that does just that in that it contains no such finality element. While
silence may in some circumstances be a useful clue in criminal investigations,
see, e.g., Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in The Memoirs of Sherlock
Holmes (1892) (regarding the case of the dog that didn’t bark), it is not a
reliable indicator of congressional purpose in the face of otherwise plain
language. Indeed, the point of plain language is that it requires no explanation.
See Avco Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 884 F.2d 621, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(noting the waggish doctrine that it is only where the statutory history is
ambiguous that a court will look to the words of the statute).Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
807
II.
The regulations also support the conclusion that the definition of the
term “conviction” in section 101(a)(48) of the Act, enacted in the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (“IIRIRA”), lacks a finality element.
The regulations contain no provision, applicable to removal proceedings under
section 240 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006), generally, that treats the term
“conviction” as defined in the Act. This fact further supports the notion that
the statutory language is clear and complete on its face and requires no
elaboration.
However, tellingly, in implementing the provisions of the Act dealing with
the expedited removal of nonlawful permanent resident aliens convicted of one
or more aggravated felonies, the Attorney General, in 1997 shortly after the
enactment of the IIRIRA, promulgated regulations that address section 238 of
the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (2006). The regulations provide in pertinent part that
for an alien to be subject to expedited removal, the alien must have “been
convicted (as defined in section 101(a)(48) of the Act . . .) of an aggravated
felony and such conviction has become final.” 8 C.F.R. § 1238.1(b)(iii)
(2008). If the definition of a “conviction” enacted by the IIRIRA bore the
understanding, as the dissent contends, that a conviction must have attained
finality, it would have been unnecessary for the regulation to specify that
the conviction must have become final. It is true that the regulation
carried forward a finality of conviction requirement in the regulations
implementing a similar provision in the Act prior to the IIRIRA. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 242.25(b)(iii) (1996). The fact remains, however, that the current regulation,
issued hard on the heels of the IIRIRA’s enactment of a definition of the term
“conviction” for the first time, coupled with the absence of any like regulation
specifying a finality principle applicable to removal proceedings generally, is
consistent with the clear language of the statute and reflects an understanding
that that definition itself embodies no finality requirement. A regulation is to
be construed like a statute, and it is a basic rule of construction, albeit not
woodenly applied, not to deem language therein to be superfluous. See, e.g.,
Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 128 S. Ct. 831, 840 (2008); Connecticut
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992).
III.
Also as a matter of concern, the dissent’s position would place the Board in
opposition to the holdings of three courts of appeals that the concept of finality
did not survive the enactment of the definition of a “conviction” in section
101(a)(48)(A) of the Act. It would also be in conflict with the considered dictaCite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
4 Puello v . Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 511 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2007)
(“IIRIRA did, however, eliminate the requirement that all direct appeals be exhausted or
waived before a conviction is considered final under the statute.”).
5 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
6 Garcia-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Saenz-Gomez, 472 F.3d 791 (10th Cir. 2007); Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035 (7th
Cir. 2004). I disagree with the dissent that these decisions should be discounted simply
because they did not arise in the immigration context. To the contrary, a statutory provision
that applies in multiple contexts must be interpreted consistently in all contexts. See
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380 (2005) (noting that even when “constitutional
concerns . . . are not present for aliens . . . who have not been admitted to the United
States . . . it cannot justify giving the same detention provision a different meaning when
such aliens are involved”); see also Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11-12 n.8 (2004).
Moreover, the dissent is mistaken in treating the above-cited decisions from the Fifth and
Seventh circuits as nonholdings. See Matter of Cardenas Abreu, supra, at 819. A reading
of the decisions belies this assertion. In both cases, the court decided the finality issue, even
though another basis (not relied on) for reaching the result existed.
7 The dissent’s statement that the “Third and Sixth Circuits have found finality to be
preserved,” Matter of Cardenas Abreu, supra, at 819, is a gross exaggeration, as in neither
case was the statement more than dicta uttered in passing. Moreover, neither decision
discussed or even cited the definition in section 101(a)(48) of the Act, in contrast to the
considered dicta in Puello v. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Servs., supra. In
addition, the dissent’s analogy to selected criminal recidivism provisions in which Congress
elected to require finality of prior convictions does not demonstrate a generally accepted
finality requirement because, as in section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, Congress has elected
not to include such a requirement in many other provisions in the criminal context that relate
to prior offenses or convictions. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 228(c), 924(c), 1029(c), 1030(c),
2241(c), 2251(e), 2252(b) (2006).
808
to the same effect of two additional circuits, including the one in which this
case arises.4
The dissent’s attempt to depreciate the force of the decisions from
the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits,
whose holdings are based on the plain language of the statute and are not
subject to being supplanted through the doctrine of deference afforded to
agency interpretations of ambiguous provisions,5
is misplaced.6
Moreover, for
its part, the dissent can point to no holding or even considered dicta of a court
of appeals in support of its analysis or result.7
Likewise, the dissent’s, and to
some extent the majority’s, reliance on or noting of the fact that Congress
explicitly retained the requirement of finality in a few selected provisions of
the Act, at best, does not aid the case that finality in a more general sense was
preserved. Indeed, that circumstance may well cut the other way. See Clay
v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 528-29 (2003) (reiterating the maxim that
“[w]hen ‘Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another section of the same Act . . . it is generally presumed thatCite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
8 For example, in a State that has no procedure for a late reinstatement of appeal, if a
defendant were to succeed in a habeas corpus challenge based on an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim predicated on the failure of counsel to file an appeal as requested, the
remedy, as with the late reinstatement statute in this case, would be to allow the defendant
to take an appeal. But there is no pre-IIRIRA Board practice or precedent of which I am
aware to support the notion that such a conviction lacks finality for immigration purposes,
such that Congress should be deemed through incorporation of our practice or case law to
have embodied such a result in section 101(a)(48) of the Act.
809
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion’” (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))).
IV.
Likewise, even the underlying premise of the dissenting opinion—that a
prior practice of the Board existed to require finality, which Congress
purportedly carried forward implicitly—is not borne out in this case. As the
majority opinion persuasively explains, while such a prior understanding
existed generally, see Matter of Ozkok, supra, no such prior practice or
understanding existed in the instant circumstances where the conviction
originally attained finality because the time to appeal expired, but the alien’s
right to appeal was restored due to a State procedure allowing, in certain cases,
for the recognition of a late appeal. Such a procedure has many of the
trappings of a collateral challenge to a conviction such that, at best from the
perspective of the dissent, prior to the IIRIRA’s enactment of the definition of
a “conviction,” it was debatable whether, even though the defendant’s motion
once granted restores a defendant’s full direct appeal rights, the conviction
should be deemed to have attained finality.8
In what appears to be the
only instance in which the Board, in a published decision, addressed the
finality question in this context, we expressly declined to decide it. Matter
of Polanco, 20 I&N Dec. 894, 898 (BIA 1994) (expressly reserving the
question of “what effect proof of a pending nunc pro tunc appeal might have
on the finality of [a] conviction.”). Absent a single prior Board precedent,
much less a long-standing practice addressing this situation, the dissent’s
reliance on the contextual ambiguity of the otherwise plain language of the
definition of a conviction enacted in 1996, arising from the Board’s allegedly
long-standing contrary understanding, falls by the wayside.
V.
Last, I wish to note that I have no quarrel from a policy perspective with
the concept of finality as previously applied by the Board. It is within a rangeCite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
9 Moreover, Congress could factor in that even if DHS opted to bring removal proceedings
based on an alien’s conviction in all situations where direct appeal was pending, it is unlikely
that a great change would ensue in terms of the removal of aliens with such pending appeals.
The time in which removal proceedings before Immigration Judges could be scheduled
would ensure that many appeals would be decided before those proceedings concluded.
When to such an interval is added the time for resolution of an alien’s appeal of right to the
Board, during which no alien may be removed, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6 (2008), the percentage of
aliens with direct appeals remaining would be small indeed. Additionally, nothing compels
the DHS to physically remove an alien who has been ordered removed while a direct appeal
of a conviction bearing on removability remains unresolved.
10 I note that myriad other policy choices are available, apart from the all or nothing ones of
either requiring finality or not in every circumstance. For example, Congress might
reasonably opt to require finality for removability determinations, but not for purposes of
bars to eligibility for relief based on a conviction. Congress could also, if it deemed
public safety considerations to so warrant, require finality only for convictions involving
nonviolent crimes, or it could designate particular offenses or types of offenses, such as those
involving national security or sexual misconduct, as not requiring finality.
810
of reasonable policy choices available to Congress and serves to assure that an
alien found removable on the basis of a conviction, who has a direct appeal of
that conviction pending, may not be removed. On the other hand, that the
elimination of finality, as three courts of appeals have rightly concluded
was accomplished by section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, likewise is not
unreasonable. See supra note 6. There is no constitutional right to an appeal
of a conviction, and, indeed, for many years in our nation’s history no such
opportunity was provided. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656
(1977). Moreover, even today a defendant may be compelled to serve in full
his or her sentence despite the pendency of a direct appeal. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1) (2006). Congress could also consider that only a small
fraction of criminal appeals by defendants is successful, and that applying
“finality” as the Board had understood it prevents the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) from instituting removal proceedings against, and
taking into custody, aliens whom it regards as dangerous and who are at large
pending appeal of their convictions.9
Thus, strong policy considerations also
support eliminating the finality requirement.10 But the point is that the policy
is not ours to make, but that of Congress, and Congress has clearly made its
decision through the plain language it adopted in section 101(a)(48)(A), which
contains no finality requirement.
VI. CONCLUSION
As demonstrated above, the position of the dissenting opinion is
unsupportable on a number of fronts. While it would reach an outcome thatCite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
11 Should further review by the Attorney General take place, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(g), (h)
(2008), I note that if the respondent’s conviction were to be affirmed in the interim, this
would not moot the case because of the doctrine of “capable of repetition yet evading
review.” E.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318-23 (1988). Moreover, the Board and the
Attorney General are not constrained by the “case or controversy” requirements of Article
III of the Constitution. See Matter of Luis, 22 I&N Dec. 747, 753 (BIA 1999).
811
some may applaud, and that Congress is free to adopt, it would bestow on the
Board a power it does not possess and would effectively legislate by adding
to, rather than interpreting, the definition of the term “conviction” in the Act.
Because I agree with the outcome and reasoning of the majority opinion as it
pertains to finality in the limited situation, as here, of a late-reinstated appeal,
and profoundly disagree with the position of the dissent that would find
finality in all contexts to have been preserved without a shred of support
therefor in the statutory language, I respectfully concur.11
DISSENTING OPINION: Anne J. Greer, Board Member, in which David
L. Neal, Vice Chairman; Neil P. Miller, Frederick D. Hess, Charles K.
Adkins-Blanch, and Linda S. Wendtland, Board Members, joined
The respondent seeks termination of proceedings because the criminal
conviction underlying the charge of deportation is pending on direct appeal.
I agree with the respondent that his conviction must still be “final” under
the statutory definition for a conviction at section 101(a)(48)(A) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2006), an issue
which the majority declines to reach. Unlike the majority, I conclude that the
pendency of a direct appeal pursuant to section 460.30 of the New York
Criminal Procedure Law means that the respondent’s conviction is not final for
immigration purposes.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The respondent, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic,
entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident on or about June 26,
1996. On or about October 11, 2007, the respondent was convicted of
burglary in the first degree in violation of section 140.30 of the New York
Penal Law. As a result, he was charged as deportable pursuant to
section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006), as
having been convicted of an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(G) of
the Act. In removal proceedings, the Immigration Judge annotated the Notice
to Appear to indicate that the respondent admitted these factual allegationsCite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
812
and, as to the conviction, had taken “no appeal yet.” On July 22, 2008, the
Immigration Judge ordered the respondent removed from the United States to
the Dominican Republic. On October 14, 2008, the respondent filed a timely
motion to reopen proceedings, presenting evidence that his criminal conviction
was pending on direct appeal pursuant to a September 26, 2008, grant of
his motion for an extension of time to appeal under section 460.30 of
New York Criminal Procedure Law. The facts are not disputed, including that
the respondent’s criminal conviction is now pending on direct appeal as of
right.
II. ISSUES
The first issue presented is whether a criminal conviction underlying a
charge of deportability or inadmissibility is required to attain finality under the
statutory definition of a conviction at section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, enacted
as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (“IIRIRA”).
If finality is required, the issue remains whether the respondent’s pending
late-filed appeal constitutes a direct appeal of his criminal conviction.
III. WHETHER FINALITY IS REQUIRED
Prior to the 1996 addition of a definition for the term “conviction” in the
Act, the prevailing standard to evaluate whether a conviction existed for
immigration purposes was set forth by this Board in Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N
Dec. 546 (BIA 1988). Neither the Ozkok definition nor the statutory
definition explicitly addresses finality, although the Board explained in Ozkok
that a criminal conviction continued to require finality in order to sustain a
charge of deportation. Id. at 552 n.7. In enacting the IIRIRA, Congress chose
language to define a conviction in terms that mirror key portions of the
Board’s definition in Ozkok. The deliberate use of parallel language reinforces
the long-held administrative and judicial requirement of “finality” that was
incorporated in Ozkok. The source of the language enacted is needed to
ascertain the plain meaning of this statutory definition, which is silent
regarding finality. Significantly, in the Board’s other precedent decisions
examining the plain meaning of section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, we
considered the relevant context in the absence of specific statutory language
speaking to the issue at hand. That same approach applies here.Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
1 See, e.g., Martinez-Montoya v. INS, 904 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that the Texas
deferred adjudication procedure, which provided for further proceedings on the issue of guilt
before entering judgment, did not constitute a conviction for immigration purposes),
superseded by statute as stated in Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994 (5th Cir. 1999); cf.
Yanez-Popp v. U.S. INS, 998 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding that a grant of “probation
without judgment” under Maryland law, during which time the court had the power to enter
a judgment or adjudication of guilt without further proceedings upon a violation of
probation, met the Ozkok standard for conviction).
2 The statutory definition of a conviction at section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act provides:
The term “conviction” means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt
of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where—
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of
guilt, and
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the
alien’s liberty to be imposed.
3 See, e.g., Wilson v. INS, 43 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1995); Yanez-Popp v. INS, supra; Molina
v. INS, 981 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1992); Chong v. INS, 890 F.2d 284 (11th Cir. 1989).
813
A. History of Finality in the Immigration Context
Under Matter of Ozkok, supra, a State deferred adjudication that provided
for a contingent right to contest guilt did not equate to a conviction, whereas
State deferred adjudications that did not afford this contingency qualified.1
According to Ozkok, a conviction exists for immigration purposes where an
alien has had a formal judgment of guilt entered by a court or, if adjudication
of guilt has been withheld, where all of the following elements are present:
(1) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or he has entered a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of
guilty, (2) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint
on the person’s liberty to be imposed, and (3) a judgment or adjudication of
guilt may be entered if the person violates the terms of his probation or fails
to comply with the requirements of the court’s order, without availability of
further proceedings regarding his guilt or innocence of the original charge.2
This definition of a conviction was widely upheld by Federal circuit courts of
appeals.3
In addition to being required to meet the Ozkok criteria, an alien’s criminal
conviction did not support a finding of deportability until it became final.
Indeed, Ozkok specifically explained that the definition of a conviction
continued to incorporate the well-settled doctrine of finality. In particular, the
Board clarified that “[i]t is well established that a conviction does not attain a
sufficient degree of finality for immigration purposes until direct appellateCite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
814
review of the conviction has been exhausted or waived.” Id. at 552 n.7 (citing
Marino v. INS, 537 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1976); Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516
F.2d 565, 570 (6th Cir. 1975); Will v. INS, 447 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1971)).
Ozkok and the circuit court cases it cites regarding finality look to the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901
(1955) (per curiam), rev’g Pino v. Nicolls, 215 F.2d 237 (1st Cir. 1954). The
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court by stating: “On the
record here we are unable to say that the conviction has attained such finality
as to support an order of deportation within the contemplation of [former
section] 241 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.” Id.
Historically, a conviction attained finality for immigration purposes when
the alien had either waived or exhausted his direct appeal rights. See, e.g.,
Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, supra. During the pendency of an alien’s direct
appeal of a criminal conviction, the former Immigration and Naturalization
Service accordingly did not commence deportation proceedings. If deportation
proceedings were initiated on the basis of a criminal conviction under direct
appellate review, the Immigration Judge had a legal basis to terminate the
proceedings. The line of cases following Ozkok prior to the IIRIRA’s
enactment continued to recognize that a conviction must attain a reasonable
degree of certainty through waiver or exhaustion of direct appeals of right to
serve as a basis for a charge of deportation under the Act. See, e.g., Wilson
v. INS, 43 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1995) (discussing finality in the context of waiver
or exhaustion of a direct appeal); cf. Matter of Onyido, 22 I&N Dec. 552, 555
(BIA 1999) (explaining that the respondent had a final conviction after the
enactment of the IIRIRA where he entered a guilty plea from which there was
no right of direct appeal).
In the IIRIRA, Congress defined a conviction as “a formal judgment of
guilt of the alien entered by a court.” Section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act.
Where adjudication of guilt is deferred, Congress enacted most of the Ozkok
test to determine whether a conviction exists. Given that Congress chose to
adopt Ozkok, except for its third prong addressing a specific category of
deferred adjudications, I conclude that Congress was aware of and accepted
the decisions of the Supreme Court, the United States courts of appeals, and
this Board underlying and affirming Ozkok, with regard to finality. Congress’s
adoption of existing language used in an established Board precedent is akin
to reenacting a portion of an existing statute while intending to preserve its
attendant administrative and judicial interpretations. See generally Lindahl
v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 782 n.15 (1985) (“‘So too, where,
as here, Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law,
Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the
interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the
new statute.’” (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978))).Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
4 See, e.g., Alim v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 1239, 1249 (11th Cir. 2006) (“As we read
§ 1101(a)(48)(A), Congress did not address the effect to be given a conviction or nolo
contondere [sic] plea that is subsequently vacated because of a defect in the underlying
criminal proceeding.”).
815
Here Congress effectively enacted language from a Board precedent
decision defining a conviction, while clearly omitting one of the Board’s three
requirements in the deferred adjudication context. In these circumstances, it
can be presumed that Congress was aware of, and intended to preserve, the
administrative and judicial interpretations attendant to the portions of the
Board precedent it enacted, particularly given the importance of the finality
doctrine in the immigration context.
This view is consistent with the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520 (1998). In
Alaska v. Native Village, the Court held that the term “dependent Indian
communities,” as used in a statute defining “Indian country,” was to be
interpreted consistently with judicial precedents issued prior to the statute’s
enactment. Id. at 528-31. These precedents required a Federal Government
set-aside for use as Indian land, together with Federal superintendence. While
the statute did not explicitly mention those well-established requirements, the
Court observed that the statute’s text derived directly from judicial precedent
and found that the statute did not alter the existing definition established by
case law. Likewise, Congress took the pertinent text of section 101(a)(48)(A)
of the Act verbatim from Matter of Ozkok, supra, and did not purport to alter
the recognition in Ozkok and other precedents of a finality requirement for
convictions serving as the factual predicate for deportability or inadmissibility.
See also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (observing that the
Court must construe a statute in light of the background rules of common law,
in which the requirement of some mens rea for a crime is firmly embedded);
cf. Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991) (observing that “[t]here
is no indication that Congress was aware of the administrative construction, or
of the appellate decisions, at the time it revised the statute”).
B. Board Interpretation of Section 101(a)(48)
The statutory language enacted by Congress to define a “conviction” is
silent as to the significance of both post-conviction ameliorative actions and
finality. Both must be addressed by the Board in interpreting this statute.4
See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand
X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). We have issued a series of precedent
decisions addressing the effect of State post-conviction actions on a convictionCite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
5 As discussed, our Roldan/Rodriguez-Ruiz/Pickering approach relied on analysis
beyond the plain words contained in section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act. Similarly, in
Matter of Eslamizar, 23 I&N Dec. 684, 686, 688 (BIA 2004), we looked beyond the “literal
reading of the conviction definition” to examine congressional intent to leave “the normal
and traditional meaning of a judgment” intact.
816
under section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act. In these decisions, we looked beyond
the statute’s plain words and considered relevant context in construing the
statute, which approach applies here.
In our first decision addressing the meaning of the new definition set forth
in the IIRIRA, we relied on the statutory language but also examined the
legislative history, which explained congressional intent to eliminate the third
prong of Ozkok to avoid inconsistent outcomes for deferred adjudications.
Matter of Punu, 22 I&N Dec. 224, 227 (BIA 1998) (citing H.R. Rep. No.
104-828, at 224 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), 1996 WL 563320)). In Punu, we
identified Congress’s intent as set forth in the legislative history to “make it
easier to remove criminal aliens, regardless of specific procedures in States for
deferred adjudication.” Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-879 (1997), 1997
WL 9288 at *295) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we found it to be “clear
that Congress deliberately modified the definition of conviction to include
deferred adjudications.” Id. (emphasis added). Next, in Matter of Roldan,
22 I&N Dec. 512 (BIA 1999), we recognized that the plain language of the
new statutory definition did not address the effect of State post-conviction
actions on a conviction for immigration purposes, requiring us to “‘look to the
particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the
statute as a whole.’” Id. at 521 (quoting K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486
U.S. 281, 291 (1988)).
In employing this contextual approach, we concluded in Roldan that certain
vacated or expunged convictions continue to serve as valid factual predicates
for a charge of deportation, despite a lack of express language to that effect in
section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act. Then, in Matter of Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 I&N
Dec. 1378 (BIA 2000), and Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 2003),
we concluded that convictions vacated on the basis of a procedural or legal
defect in the underlying criminal proceedings do not remain convictions
for immigration purposes.5
Our statutory interpretation of the conviction
definition regarding post-conviction modification has been well received byCite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
6 See, e.g., Alim v. Gonzales, supra; Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2005);
Cruz-Garza v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir. 2005); Ali v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 722 (7th
Cir. 2005); Ikenokwalu-White v. INS, 316 F.3d 798 (8th Cir. 2003).
7 See Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS, 322 F.3d 804, 812 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding a conviction to
remain a valid basis for removal despite being vacated or expunged for other than
immigration purposes); cf. Discipio v. Ashcroft, 417 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2005) (observing
that no other circuit disagrees with Pickering, but declining to revisit the panel decision in
Renteria-Gonzalez absent en banc intervention), vacating 369 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 2004).
8 If an alien’s criminal conviction were ultimately overturned on direct appeal, the
conviction would no longer support a charge of removability. Removal of the individual
pending direct appellate review would lead to serious consequences should the conviction
be reversed. See, e.g., Staples v. United States, supra, at 616 (observing that a potentially
harsh penalty supports reading the statute to encompass a traditional mens rea requirement
not included in statutory language). If the conviction is ultimately overturned after removal
has occurred, the respondent cannot seek reopening of the removal proceedings. Matter of
Armendarez, 24 I&N Dec. 646 (BIA 2008) (construing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2008) to mean
that the Board and immigration courts lack jurisdiction to reopen the proceedings of aliens
who have been removed). Consequently, the majority opinion’s observation regarding the
potential availability of a motion to reopen after a conviction has actually been vacated does
not assist an alien who already has been removed.
817
the circuit courts,6
with the exception of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit.7

Here, as with finality, section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act does not
specifically speak to the effect of post-conviction actions addressed at altering
the underlying conviction. While the statute could be read to eliminate the
effect of all post-conviction measures, including substantive vacaturs, as stated
by the Eleventh Circuit, such an approach would be “so foreign, so
antithetical, to the long-standing principles underlying our criminal justice
system and our notions of due process that we would expect Congress to have
spoken very clearly if it intended to effect such results.” Alim v. Gonzales, 446
F.3d 1239, 1249 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S.
310, 322 (1892)).8

As we said in Roldan, “Congress has approved the federal approach taken
in Ozkok, but has gone even further than Ozkok by eliminating the one prong
of our former definition which required an examination of how a specific
state structured its rehabilitative statute.” Matter of Roldan, supra, at 522. In
my view, Congress approved the Ozkok Federal approach that incorporated
finality, rather than eliminating the requirement through silence on the
subject. See generally Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698-99
(1979) (finding the legal context at the time of a statute’s enactment relevant in
evaluating congressional action and stating that it was “not only appropriate
but also realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with . . .
important precedents from . . . federal courts and that it expected itsCite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
9 In Staples v. United States, supra, the Court determined that the “substantial body of
precedent” on the question whether Congress intended to dispense with a conventional
mens rea element provided so helpful an interpretive tool that it was not even necessary to
rely on the rule of lenity, under which an ambiguous criminal statute is to be construed in
favor of the accused. Id. at 619 n.17; see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001); INS
v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966) (“‘[S]ince the stakes are considerable for the individual
[charged with deportability], we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on his
freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the
words used.’” (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948))).
818
enactment to be interpreted in conformity with them”); see also Zuni Public
Schools Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1545-46 (2007)
(noting that the “‘[m]eaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases
may only become evident when placed in context’” (quoting FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000))).
The concurrence of Board Member Pauley disavows any intention to treat
convictions subjected to substantive vacaturs as giving rise to removability,
and it endeavors to justify its different approach in that context by pointing to
the maxim that permits deviating from plain statutory language when its literal
application would lead to absurd results. Notably, however, the Eleventh
Circuit did not employ such a rationale when it held that convictions that are
vacated for underlying defects become invalid for immigration purposes
in Alim v. Gonzales, supra. Rather, the court concluded that section
101(a)(48)(A) “does not specify” how to treat such convictions, but instead
“defines a conviction up through the time of sentence,” while “say[ing]
nothing about what effect, if any, the conviction or plea should be given when
there is a subsequent vacatur because the alien’s statutory or constitutional
rights were violated during the underlying criminal proceeding.” Id. at 1248
(emphasis added). The court thus found “statutory silence,” rather than relying
on plain language, and turned to addressing the reasonableness of the Board’s
construction of the statute. Id. at 1249.9
C. Circuit Court Consideration of Finality Under
Section 101(a)(48)(A)
Six circuit courts of appeals, including the Second Circuit, have addressed
finality under section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act with differing results. None of
the decisions of these courts examines the issue as it is presented here, i.e.,
during the pendency of a direct appeal of the conviction supporting removal.
See, e.g., Alim v. Gonzales, supra, at 1248 (explaining that precedent dealing
with the ongoing validity of convictions set aside for State rehabilitative
purposes did not address, and therefore did not govern, the situation
presented). The Second Circuit has observed in dicta that the IIRIRACite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
819
eliminated the requirement for finality under section 101(a)(48)(A). Puello
v. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 511 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir.
2007). Puello did not involve a challenge based on an appeal of a conviction.
The alien in Puello had pled guilty and was challenging the effective date of
the conviction for purposes of his naturalization application. The Fifth Circuit
in Garcia-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 284, 290-91 (5th Cir. 2007), also
noted in dicta that finality is no longer required. However, the court clarified
that no “appeal [was] actually pending for [the alien’s] . . . conviction.” Id. at
290; see also Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994 (5th Cir. 1999) (addressing deferred
adjudication rather than a direct appeal of a criminal conviction). Moreover,
in Garcia-Maldonado, the court relied chiefly on its prior holding in
Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS, supra, that even a conviction that has actually been
vacated for substantive legal defects would remain valid for immigration
purposes.
The Third and Sixth Circuits have found finality to be preserved. In
United States v. Garcia-Echaverria, 374 F.3d 440, 445 (6th Cir. 2004), the
court stated that “[t]o support an order of deportation, a conviction must be
final” in terms of exhaustion of direct appeal rights. In Garcia-Echaverria,
which is a criminal illegal reentry case, the court held that the alien’s
conviction was final for immigration purposes. The court found that the
appeals at issue were “collateral attacks upon Garcia-Echaverria’s conviction,”
filed after the time expiration of the direct appeal deadline, and concluded that
his “conviction was final for removal purposes.” Id. at 446. Most recently, in
Paredes v. Attorney General of U.S., 528 F.3d 196, 198 (3d Cir. 2008), the
court, quoting the now superseded Ozkok as controlling without discussing the
statutory conviction definition, observed that “‘[a] conviction does not attain
a sufficient degree of finality for immigration purposes until direct appellate
review of the conviction has been exhausted or waived.’”
While the Tenth Circuit has held that finality is no longer required in
United States v. Saenz-Gomez, 472 F.3d 791, 794 (10th Cir. 2007), which
arose in the sentence enhancement context, I observe that at the time of the
court’s decision, the alien’s criminal appeals had already been dismissed by
the New Mexico Court of Appeals and the New Mexico Supreme Court. Id.
at 792. Recognizing that the court held that a conviction already existed for
immigration purposes at the time of the alien’s removal from the United States,
prior to defense counsel’s filing of his direct criminal appeal, I respectfully
disagree with that aspect of the holding. In Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d
1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 2004), the Seventh Circuit’s consideration of finality was
also moot because the alien’s direct appeals had been exhausted at the time of
the Immigration Judge’s decision, and the United States Supreme Court denied
his petition for certiorari almost 5 years before the Seventh Circuit’s decision.
See Montenegro v. Illinois, 525 U.S. 1158 (1999) (denying certiorari). Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
10 Griffiths involves the same “on file” procedure at issue in Pino v. Landon, supra, that
“‘suspend[ed] the adjudicative process, including the defendant’s right to appeal, until such
time as the court reactivates or makes some further disposition of the case.’” Griffiths v. INS,
supra, at 51 (quoting White v. INS, 17 F.3d 475, 479 (1st Cir. 1994)). Pino did not provide
a rationale for concluding that the Massachusetts “on file” procedure failed to meet the
finality requirement and did not set forth a finality standard. As discussed, extensive case
law came to consensus in defining finality for immigration purposes, culminating in the
Ozkok standard. Under the third prong in Ozkok, the Pino/Griffiths “on file” procedure
would not equate to a conviction because it constitutes a deferred adjudication that could
allow for further proceedings on guilt or innocence in the future. Today, under the section
101(a)(48)(A) statutory definition, an attenuated possibility of obtaining appellate review for
a deferred adjudication has been specifically defined as not detracting from the finality of
a conviction for immigration purposes. Matter of Punu, supra.
820
In Griffiths v. INS, 243 F.3d 45, 53 n.3 (1st Cir. 2001), the court
highlighted the distinction between a deferred adjudication and a direct appeal
for purposes of finality. In Griffiths, the First Circuit reserved the question
whether finality remains intact, agreeing with the Board that the alien had been
the subject of a deferred adjudication, which does constitute a conviction under
the section 101(a)(48)(A) statutory definition. Significantly, in Griffiths, the
court observed that “[t]here are substantial practical differences between the
situation faced by a defendant currently exercising a direct appellate right and
that faced by a defendant with a theoretically available right to appeal.” Id. at
54.10
Thus, the circuit court decisions—both those that find the requirement of
finality retained and those that find it superseded—offer conflicting statements
in circumstances different from the instant case that heighten the Board’s
responsibility to interpret the Act. See generally Nat’l Cable & Telecomms.
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., supra (holding that a court’s prior judicial
construction of a statute prevails over an agency construction that is otherwise
entitled to deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., supra, only if the prior court decision holds that the
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves
no room for agency discretion).
D. Finality Preserved Elsewhere in the Act
If Congress had intended to remove the finality requirement under the Act,
it presumably would have done so uniformly throughout the Act, rather than
leaving finality intact in other provisions without apparent justification. See,
e.g., sections 237(a)(2)(D), 238(c)(3)(A)(iii), 241(a)(4)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1227(a)(2)(D), 1228(c)(3)(A)(iii), 1231(a)(4)(B) (2006). We find reading
finality out of the Act in this manner to be impermissible because it fails toCite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
11 The Pauley concurrence argues that the regulatory requirement at 8 C.F.R.
§ 1238.1(b)(1)(iii) (2008) that convictions be final to support an order of expedited removal
supports reading section 101(a)(48)(A) as not including finality. However, the regulation
contained the exact same finality requirement prior to enactment of section 101(a)(48)(A).
8 C.F.R. § 242.25(b)(1)(iii) (1996). Further, regulatory emphasis on finality in the expedited
removal context, where removal occurs quickly without proceedings before an Immigration
Judge, does not undermine its vitality in adversarial removal proceedings.
821
“interpret the statute ‘as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme’ . . .
and ‘fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole.’” FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., supra, at 133 (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,
513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995), and FTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U.S. 385,
389 (1959)). 11
IV. WHETHER A PENDING APPEAL UNDER SECTION 460.30
OF THE NEW YORK CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW
IS A FINAL CONVICTION
Direct appeals for purposes of finality are interpreted to mean direct
appeals of right, not including the potential for discretionary review on direct
appeal. For example, the Board held in Matter of Polanco, 20 I&N Dec. 894
(BIA 1994), that an alien who did not exercise his direct appeal of right under
New Jersey law had a final conviction, despite the potential for seeking a
discretionary nunc pro tunc appeal. Of significance to the Board in Polanco
were the indeterminate time available to file the appeal and the appeal’s
discretionary nature. The majority and concurring opinions maintain that
because we left open the question whether the authorization of a discretionary
nunc pro tunc appeal would render a conviction not final for immigration
purposes in Matter of Polanco, supra, there is no history of administrative
applications of the finality rule in the “late appeal” context. This position
overlooks our conclusion in Polanco that the kind of “late appeal” at issue was
like a collateral attack, rather than a direct appeal, because the pertinent State
law set forth no deadline for seeking authorization to file the late appeal, and
the decision whether to authorize the appeal was largely discretionary. Cf.
Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S. Ct. 681 (2009) (finding that for purposes of
triggering the limitations period for Federal habeas review, the date of the
conviction’s finality was the date of conclusion of the direct appeal that the
State court had granted a right to file out of time).
I must respectfully disagree with the majority opinion’s characterization of
New York’s procedure for obtaining a nunc pro tunc extension of the time for
taking a direct criminal appeal as creating too much “uncertainty and delay”Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
822
to affect a conviction’s finality for immigration purposes. Matter of Cardenas
Abreu, 24 I&N Dec. 795, 801 (BIA 2009). Section 460.30(1) of the New York
Criminal Procedure Law provides for a late appeal under only very limited
circumstances, requiring the defendant to demonstrate that his failure to file an
appeal during the normal time period resulted from either (a) “improper
conduct of a public servant or improper conduct, death or disability of the
defendant’s attorney,” or (b) “inability of the defendant and his attorney to
have communicated, in person or by mail, concerning whether an appeal
should be taken, prior to the expiration of the time within which to take an
appeal[,] due to [the] defendant’s incarceration in an institution and through
no lack of due diligence or fault of the attorney or defendant.” Further, the
defendant must exercise due diligence in filing his extension motion, and in
any case must do so not more than 1 year after the normal appeal period’s
expiration. Id. Although the court may order further fact-finding if necessary,
the extension motion “must” ultimately be granted if a legal basis for it is
ultimately demonstrated. Id. §§ 460.30(3)-(5).
This procedure is a far cry from the New Jersey procedure that was
involved in Matter of Polanco, supra. In that case we found it “significant”
that there were “no time constraints whatsoever to limit the period” during
which permission to take a nunc pro tunc appeal could be sought. Id. at 897.
We also relied heavily on New Jersey’s treatment of such motions as
“discretionary in nature.” Id. Although the majority opinion observes that
New York’s implementation of its procedure for determining whether its
mandatory late-appeal criteria have, in fact, been satisfied can potentially
result in time delays of indeterminate length, the same could be said of the
process for adjudication of criminal appeals generally. But Congress has never
determined that such timing considerations outweigh the importance of
ensuring that a conviction has attained a sufficient degree of finality before it
can give rise to a removal order.
Moreover, the fact that New York in this instance has actually authorized
a late criminal appeal necessarily means that it has determined that the
respondent has, in fact, demonstrated, after exercising due diligence, that his
failure to file a timely appeal resulted from improper conduct by a public
servant or by the respondent’s criminal defense attorney, the death or disability
of that attorney, or an inability of the respondent and his attorney to
communicate in a timely manner about a potential criminal appeal because of
his incarceration, and through no fault of his own. If New York wishes to
authorize extensions of time for filing direct criminal appeals under these kinds
of circumstances, I do not believe that it is the province of this Board to
effectively determine for immigration purposes that such appeals are not
legitimately “direct” after all. Indeed, for purposes of removal proceedings,
this Board, the Attorney General, or Congress has determined that the sameCite as 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3641
12 Deferred adjudication, also known as a “deferred judgment,” is defined as a “judgment
placing a convicted defendant on probation, the successful completion of which will prevent
entry of the underlying judgment of conviction.” Black’s Law Dictionary 454, 859 (8th ed.
2004).
823
kinds of circumstances can warrant tolling or (in at least one circumstance)
negation of an otherwise applicable deadline. See Matter of Compean,
Bangaly & J-E-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 710 (A.G. 2009) (holding that, in the exercise
of discretion, the Board may toll the deadline for filing a motion to reopen
where the alien demonstrates, and exercises due diligence in discovering,
deficient performance of counsel); section 240(b)(5)(C)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) (2006) (providing that a motion to reopen and rescind an
in absentia order may be filed “at any time” if the alien demonstrates that he
was in Federal or State custody at the time of his hearing, and that his failure
to appear was through no fault of his own). Although the majority opinion
would find it determinative that New York’s procedure for extending criminal
appeal deadlines nunc pro tunc is not equivalent to “the typical direct appeal
as of right, which imposes prompt filing deadlines and requires only a
ministerial act in accepting a notice of appeal,” Matter of Cardenas Abreu,
supra, at 801, I would not impose such inflexible conditions on direct appeals
for the purpose of determining the finality of a conviction for immigration
purposes, particularly when we have not done so in the context of setting
deadlines for motions filed in removal proceedings.
V. CONCLUSION
Absent clear statutory language to the contrary, I would find that the
historically accepted rule of finality in immigration law continues to apply
when a charge of removal requires a criminal conviction. In doing so, I
recognize that the consequences of removal in some cases might very well be
considered severe enough to ensure that a reasonable degree of finality has
been attained in terms of exhaustion or waiver of direct appeals of right,
essentially ensuring that no premature removal occurs. I do not believe that
Congress’s explicit concern over deferred adjudications, which by definition
provide an opportunity for mitigation after the establishment of guilt,
encompasses a challenge to guilt through the direct appeals process.12
In my view, the New York statute allowing for late-filed direct appeals
preserves a respondent’s direct appeal rights. As such, the conviction does not
trigger civil removal consequences for an alien—if the late-filed appeal is
accepted by the appellate court and until it is resolved. Accordingly, I would
sustain the respondent’s appeal and terminate removal proceedings.