Cite as 25 I&N Dec. 791 (BIA 2012) Interim Decision #3750
791
Matter of A-Y-M-, Respondent
Decided May 8, 2012
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
Following the enactment of the Child Status Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 107-208, 116
Stat. 927 (2002), an unmarried alien seeking derivative asylum status based on the approval
of his or her parent’s application for asylum who turned 21 while the application was
pending continues to be classified as a “child” for purposes of qualifying for derivative
status under section 208(b)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(3)(B) (2006).
FOR RESPONDENT: Juan A. Laguna, Esquire, Santa Ana, California
BEFORE: Board Panel: GUENDELSBERGER and ADKINS-BLANCH, Board Members;
KENDALL CLARK, Temporary Board Member.
KENDALL CLARK, Temporary Board Member:
In a decision dated July 9, 2010, an Immigration Judge found the
respondent inadmissible, denied her applications for relief based on her claim
of persecution, and ordered her removed from the United States. The
respondent has appealed from the Immigration Judge’s decision to deny her
application for asylum. The appeal will be sustained and the record will
be remanded to the Immigration Judge.
The respondent is a 23-year-old unmarried native and citizen
of El Salvador. On March 25, 2005, when she was 16 years old, the
respondent sought admission to the United States with her mother. They were
denied admission and were subsequently placed in removal proceedings.
At their hearing, the respondent and her mother conceded removability, and
they each submitted an Application for Asylum and for Withholding
of Removal (Form I-589). Their applications were accepted into evidence
by the Immigration Judge on February 1, 2006. The Immigration Judge
granted the respondent’s mother’s application but denied the respondent’s.
The only issue on appeal concerns the respondent’s eligibility for asylum.Cite as 25 I&N Dec. 791 (BIA 2012) Interim Decision #3750
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Section 208(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(3)(A) (2006), provides the following:
A spouse or child (as defined in section 101(b)(1) (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E)) of an
alien who is granted asylum under this subsection may, if not otherwise eligible for
asylum under this section, be granted the same status as the alien if accompanying,
or following to join, such alien.
The record reflects that the respondent’s mother listed the respondent
on her asylum application and specifically noted that the respondent was
to be included in her application. Thus, even though the Immigration Judge
found that the respondent had not independently established eligibility for
asylum, she may qualify for derivative status under section 208(b)(3)(A) of the
Act based on the approval of her mother’s asylum application.
The respondent, who was unmarried and 17 years of age when her mother
submitted an asylum application, qualified as a “child” within the meaning
of section 101(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (2006), which defines
a child as “an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age.” However,
at the time of the Immigration Judge’s decision, the respondent was 22 years
old. Nevertheless, we find that she continues to be classified as a “child” and
qualifies as a derivative beneficiary under her mother’s application because
she did not “age out.”
In order to prevent the children of asylum applicants from losing derivative
eligibility as a result of “aging out,” Congress enacted the Child Status
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 107-208, 116 Stat. 927 (2002) (“CSPA”), “which,
among other things, broadened eligibility for derivative asylum status.”
Akhtar v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2005). The CSPA enacted
section 208(b)(3)(B) of the Act, which currently provides as follows:
An unmarried alien who seeks to accompany, or follow to join, a parent granted
asylum under this subsection, and who was under 21 years of age on the date
on which such parent applied for asylum under this section, shall continue
to be classified as a child for purposes of this paragraph and section 209(b)(3), if the
alien attained 21 years of age after such application was filed but while it was
pending.
Thus, pursuant to section 208(b)(3)(B) of the Act, “[a]n unmarried alien
seeking derivative asylum status who turns twenty-one years old while his
or her parent’s application for asylum is pending continues to be classified
as a ‘child’ for purposes of [section 208(b)(3)].” Akhtar v. Gonzales,
406 F.3d at 407; see also Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 570 n.1 (7th Cir.
2003). This provision applies to the respondent because her mother’s asylum
application was filed after the enactment of the CSPA. See generally Matter
of Avila-Perez, 24 I&N Dec. 78 (BIA 2007). Consequently, the respondent,Cite as 25 I&N Dec. 791 (BIA 2012) Interim Decision #3750
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an unmarried alien who turned 21 years old while her mother’s asylum
application was pending, continues to be classified as a “child” for purposes
of establishing eligibility for derivative status under section 208(b)(3)(B)
of the Act.
On the record before us, we find that the respondent warrants a grant
of derivative asylum under section 208(b)(3)(A) of the Act based on the
approval of her mother’s asylum application by the Immigration Judge.
Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal will be sustained and the record will
be remanded to the Immigration Judge for the completion of background and
identity checks. See Matter of Avila-Perez, 24 I&N Dec. at 85 (sustaining
an appeal where the respondent “appear[ed] to be statutorily eligible” for relief
from removal under the CSPA); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(6)(ii)(A)
(2012).
ORDER: The appeal is sustained.
FURTHER ORDER: Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(6), the record
is remanded to the Immigration Judge for the purpose of allowing the
Department of Homeland Security to complete or update the appropriate
identity, law enforcement, or security investigations or examinations; for
further proceedings, if necessary; and for the entry of an order as provided
by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(h) (2012).